Heidegger is often attacked for his failure to offer a thematic account of the body in his Being and Time (Aho, 2005 
Introduction
Everyone has started re-discovering the bodymodern, pre-modern and post-modern. According to Rosser (2001) , the body is everywhere. The body talked about is the 'condemned body', or the 'privileged one', the 'body as representation' or as 'confrontation'. The body, exclusively as an objective material thing with measurable properties, follows from the Cartesian-Galilean traditional model of looking at things. But where is the body of the 'life world', the body that eats, that works, that dies, and that is afraid (Bynum, 1995) ? The body that Heidegger is looking at is different from the Cartesian model. Heidegger is concerned with the real living body -in other words, the body that eats, that works, that dies, that is afraid, which lives out there in the world -and not with the body (corpse) lying on the table of the doctors (Askay, 1999) . For Heidegger, corporeality merely indicates that the body is physically present (korperhaft). It fails to see the phenomenological problem of the body, namely that we are 'there' in a 'bodily' manner (Aho, 2005) .
According to Heidegger, the body is personalized in a lived context or environment. The person is not composed of separate body parts, and does not constitute a mind-body dualism as in the Cartesian model, but is an integrated bodily unit that is situated in a specific location and time. As Deutsch (1993) writes, "Persons have bodies to the degree to which they appropriate the physical conditions of their individuality and become integrated (and not merely unified) psychological beings" (p. 5). This means that, at the pre-reflective level, the person 'ex-ists' the body, "I am "embodied" in the sense … that I am my body" (p. 5).
Lived Body and Corpse Body
We find ourselves in a situation where we are theoretically talking about the corpse body, while practically looking for the lived body. The theoretical quest of Descartes has assured us of the disembodied and detached cogito. After Descartes, body became a problem for most philosophers, who could make
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daring 'thought experiments' dichotomizing the real inner core from its accidental body-layer. However, Heideggerian worldly and embodied Dasein shares a pre-reflective bond between the body and the world. Heidegger used the word 'body' with caution, not because he wanted to give less priority to the embodied Dasein, but rather because he was reluctant to use the bifurcated subject/object models that have been passed over as the only acceptable model of understanding our bodily nature. From that perspective, our body is a problem to us. As Heidegger (1927 Heidegger ( /1962 Heidegger uses the evocative term "throwness" to connote this inescapable submission to existence itself. We are beings thrown into existence. Dasein is always and already "delivered over to the Being which, in existing, it has to be" (Heidegger, 1927 (Heidegger, / 1962 . For Heidegger we are forced to confront this 'throwness' most powerfully in 'stateof-mind'. State-of-mind, or mood, discloses existence prior to and beyond either cognition or will. We always 'find ourselves' in a mood just as, I would add, we find ourselves in a body, while knowledge and intention come later. At this point, Dasein has the opportunity to grasp hold of its 'throwness', to choose its enigmatic, unexplainable specificity and inhabit the possibilities of its 'there'. "In just this way, the practice of Contact Improvisation forces me over and over to confront my mood, to pay attention to my bodily state, to notice the body I actually have and to dance with it" (Gronda, 2002, ¶13) . All these layers essentially constitute the Dasein's essential core and make it fragile and worldly. This is an easy acceptance of the fact that Dasein is thrown into his facticity: that is how it exists and so it exists that way,
with red hair or white, as a man or as a woman. As long this easy acceptance is there on Dasein's part, his facticity is not a problem for him. He is at home with all these diverse traits of his as he is essentially a dweller searching for a home in a foreign place. This tension between the two is what makes him a worldly Dasein. Heidegger says that "the mood brings Dasein before the 'that-it-is' of its 'there', which as such, stares it in the face with the in exorability of an enigma" (1927/1962, p. 175) . At this point, Dasein has the opportunity to grasp hold of its 'throwness'. Within this model, a person's normal and spontaneous rootedness bestows on him/her a sense of dwelling, as the healthy man is a habitual dweller in his life world. It is in this sense that the world is not alien, nor is the person a stranger to the world that is his place of dwelling. Reflection on the body is a later phase that is based on pre-reflective habitual awareness of the body. At the reflective level, the body announces itself objectively in terms of its disruption of the normal course of the life-world. The same 'lived body' in its sheer corporeality is reduced to a 'sick body' and problematic part that can either be corrected of its peculiarity and its abnormality or, in the worst case, eliminated. "Heidegger argues that, for the most part, Dasein turns away from facing the enigma of its throwness. And I think we're even expert at turning away from the moods themselves ... how often have you said -'I'm just not sure how I feel'? Grasping hold of the 'there' -the facticity of Dasein's throwness -is not an easy task" (Gronda, 2002, ¶13) .
Illness as Unhomelikeness Being-in-the-World
But what if the body I have is paralyzed or if my capacity to be touched is marred by sexual abuse? What if the body I have is judged to be less than human due to its colour? Can I still accept the body I have? Should I bear it? … How to deal with that specificity is a political question. … There is very little space for the abnormal body to live. Most importantly, I make very little space for my own abnormality. (Gronda, 2002, ¶15) As a broken tool thwarts the builder's plans, so the ill body disrupts the patient's plans. While the analogy of the ill body as a broken tool effectively captures the impact illness has on the patient's experience of the body, this is not to say that the body is a tool and that the ill body is a broken tool. According to Marcum (2004, pp. 125-137) , it would be wrong to call the body parts tools since they are also part of Dasein as self. They are not only a part of the totality of tools, but also, as lived (leibliche), they belong to the projective power of the self.
Heideggerians would respond to this as a problem for the theoretical philosopher and the speculator who is torn between the two: his body and himself. For Heidegger, the man on the street dwells in his body, and, in the same spirit, dwells in his 'facticity' and his vulnerability. It is a problem when the sick body or the pained body is abstracted from its own homely context and from its dwelling place. In abstraction, "…there is a subject: a 'you,' posited separate from another entity, 'the body'. The relation seems to be about possession: you, the subject, have or own an object, the body" (Marcum, 2004, p. 40) . It is not my active design to possess or not to possess a body. For Heidegger, we "find ourselves" in a mood just as, one can add, 'we find ourselves in a body'. That is to say, in a lived relation, the one does not encroach the boundary of the other, both share an intimate bond as integral parts of one inclusive whole. Now, if health is just a harmonious blend of the corpse body and the lived one, illness can be understood as an unhomelike Being-in-the-world in which one's own body is a stranger to one. In terms of Heidegger's notion of sorge (care), the meaningstructure of illness as Being-in-the World is made possible or articulated with respect to a person's concern as a Being-thrown-into-a-world that is often strangely unfamiliar or unhomelike. This is certainly the case when a person is diagnosed with a fatal illness or must live with a debilitating illness. As an embodied person, the patient comes to know the authentic and genuine self as limited and finite, especially in the face of death or chronic illness. The face of death or illness and the anxiety (angst) over them are the bases of the patient's life-world or Being-in-the-world. By resolving the anxiety surrounding the patient's illness through reestablishing the patient's homelikeness, the patient is healed even though the diseased body part is not cured.
In the contest of health-care, it is would therefore be expected that physicians learn to utilize effectively in the healing process the patient's anxious care about bodily existence. The question facing us today is whether it is too late to humanize the mechanized body in terms of the embodied person in order to address the crisis of care facing modern medical practice. My body is one place where the pain of difference can and must be borne. The body practice of affirming the facts of your existence -its physical, psychological, cultural and political specificitiesand discovering what you can do with them is the only resource to resist a normalising power. And
bearing your actual weight is not just a personal issue. The global distribution of body mass is a literal indicator of world inequities. To bear my actual weight is in part to accept that Westerners are more likely to die of obesity than starvation (vide Bialystok, 1997) .
Conclusion
Heidegger did not want to make any fuss about the pained body or the wounded body, abnormal body or split body, a body that is 'no one's' but is left exposed in its naked facticity to be scrutinized by 'any body'. His philosophy intended the practical Dasein for whom the human body is always already 'alive', handling, sensing and perceiving intra-worldly things in a particular way. The 'lived-body' (Leib) is not a bounded, material substance (Korper) that is extended in space, and it cannot be scientifically observed from a distance, because it is already spatially involved, manoeuvring through rooms, handling equipment, sensing who or what is in front or behind and so forth. The body is already 'in my way' as the original source of all practical comportment (vide Carman, 1999) . According to Cerbone (2000) , Heidegger was reluctant to talk about 'the body' in connection with the explication of Dasein, by arguing that doing so would be at odds with the kind of investigation his 'phenomenology of everydayness' is meant to be . The IPJP is a joint project of the Humanities Faculty of the University of Johannesburg in South Africa and Edith Cowan University's Faculty of Regional Professional Studies in Australia. This document is subject to copyright and may not be reproduced in whole or in part via any medium without the express permission of the publishers.
